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Abstract 
Currently an entire unregulated industry of Environmental Control Officers (ECOs) is active 
at various construction sites across South Africa.  While the expected role of ECOs is 
generally to ensure that environmental authorisation (EA) conditions are implemented and 
monitored, differing views on the role and independence of the industry still exist between 
practitioners.  This paper presents quantitative and qualitative response results from a 
questionnaire survey of 50 South African environmental practitioners on the role and 
independence of the ECO industry with an emphasis on practitioner comments reproduced in 
their own words and ‘voice’.  The practitioners identified: compliance monitoring; 
implementation and enforcement; ensuring legal compliance; advising and/or consulting; 
communicating; reporting; and raisings awareness as the key roles of an ECO.  It was also 
noted that competency and independence of an ECO should be consistently reflected in EA 
and EMP requirements to avoid confusion on these issues in practice.  They also identified 
competence and the regulation thereof, as well as support from developers, government, and 
other role-players as core needs of the industry to successfully fulfil their roles.  Furthermore, 
independence to all role-players was held in high regard and they had a cautionary message 
to avoid obsessing the independence issue to such an extent that it compromises the ability to 
fulfil their roles.  In order to streamline future practices and to provide some consensus, this 
paper concludes with a proposed definition for the role of an independent ECO by drawing 
together the views presented by the practitioners. 
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One of the most significant challenges facing the South African Environmental Impact 
Assessment (hereafter EIA)1 system is compliance monitoring2 and enforcement3 of 
Environmental Management Plan (hereafter EMP) and EA conditions4 of the thousands5 of 
                                                 
1 Many notable works describe the elements of a generic EIA process, which includes: firstly a preliminary 
assessment phase that consists of screening and scoping; secondly a detailed assessment phase consisting of 
impact analyses, drafting mitigation and management plans as well as an environmental impact statement/report, 
the review of the report and a decision on the application; and finally an implementation and follow-up phase, 
which consists of post-decision management and implementation, monitoring and auditing of implementation 
and post decision analyses.  More specific details of the South African EIA process can be found in s 24 (1)(a), 
(4)(a)(i) to (iv) and s (4)(b)(i) to (vii) of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (hereafter the 
NEMA).  See also the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations in GN R543 GG 33306 of 18 June 2010 
(hereafter the EIA regulations); J Glazewski (ed) Environmental Law in South Africa (2nd ed 2005) at 249; and 
PJ Aucamp Environmental Impact Assessment: A Practical Guide for the Discerning Practitioner (2009) at 6.  
For international literature see for example: the International Association for Impact Assessment and Institute 
for Environmental Assessment (IAIA) UK 1999 Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment Best Practice 
at http://www.iaia.org/publications/ (accessed 21 December 2011); J Arts EIA Follow-up (1998) at 26; N Lee 
and C George Environmental Assessment in Developing and Transitional Countries (2000) at 6; C Wood 
Environmental Impact Assessment: A comparative Review (2nd ed 2003) at 7; and A Morrison-Saunders and J 
Arts (eds) Assessing Impact: Handbook of EIA and SEA Follow-up (2004) at 2. 
2 According to the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) ‘Environmental Impact Assessment and 
Management Strategy: Sub-Theme 4: Compliance and Enforcement’ (prepared by SE Solutions Pty Ltd, Sean 
O'Beirne for Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria) (04 August 2011) at 10, ‘the principle is that 
Compliance Monitoring identifies on an ongoing basis: activities that are in breach of the law and conditions of 
the EA; improperly authorised activities; and so forth’. 
3 The DEA (n2) at 12 describe the role of enforcement in the context of government as: ‘enforcement serves 
to take the action required to maintain compliance through various means such as issuing warning letters; pre-
compliance and compliance notices; and launching criminal investigations that may result in enforcement’.  
According to L Feris ‘Compliance Notices - A New Tool in Environmental Enforcement’ (2006) 9 Potch 
Electronic Journal (PER) 118 at 53, environmental enforcement remains a problem in South African law and 
may be attributed to the lack of capacity and insufficient resources within national and provincial government. 
4 Internationally and nationally it is a well established that compliance monitoring and implementation is one 
of the weakest areas of EIA activity.  See amongst others C Wood (n1) at 255 and Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA) Review of the Application of Environmental Impact Assessment in Selected African Countries 
(2005) at xiv and 46-47 at www.uneca.org (accessed 1 October 2011).  The ECA found that in spite of many 
countries making implementation of the EMP or an appropriate permit a legal requirement, more often than not 
implementation and follow-up are neglected and grossly ineffective in most African countries.  With regards to 
South Africa the DEA (n2) at 7 states that ‘compliance and enforcement is inadequate’ and set a goal of 
‘ensuring that compliance monitoring and enforcement procedures within the organisational structure of 
Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) are adequate and effective’. 
5 South African developers conduct more than a 1000 Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) per year.  
For example N Rossouw and others, ‘Country Reports - South Africa’ in P Tarr (ed) Environmental Impact 
Assessment in Southern Africa (2003) report that since the promulgation of the EIA regulations in 1997 the six 
South African provinces investigated in the study received a total of 5367 applications in less than 5 years.  
Furthermore, this number is significantly escalated by the fact that environmental assessments are also 
conducted in terms of several other environmental Acts such as the National Water Act 36 of 1998, the National 
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approved EIA applications per year.  There are many interrelated factors contributing to this 
challenge such as: the scale of the task and enforcement capacity (number of projects 
compared to number of resources); the scale of projects (including verification of EIA 
findings, authorisation fixation, ineffectual Monitoring Committees (hereafter MCs), lack of 
response to reported transgressions, and ambiguity of EMPs); quality and ambiguity of EAs; 
extension of function; bureaucratization; poor communication; and lack of authority and 
authority coordination.6  However, the lack of effective environmental governance7 may be 
highlighted as a critical contributor in developing countries such as South Africa.8  In 
response to situations where government cannot govern effectively on a particular matter on 
its own, a government may impose certain governance duties onto civil society to assist in the 
particular governance effort.  In terms of the NEMA9 for example, a developer has to apply 
for an EA for listed activities and as part of the conditions, the competent authority may 
require the developer to appoint an ECO10 with specific environmental responsibilities.11  In 
                                                                                                                                                        
Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008 (hereafter the NEMWA), the National Environmental 
Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 (hereafter the NEMAQA), and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002. 
6 See DEA (n2) 1-44. 
7 LJ Kotzé et al ‘Strategies to Integrate Environmental Policy at the Operational Level: Towards an 
Integrated Framework for Environmental Authorisations’ (2007) South African Journal of Environmental Law 
and Policy at 57, defines environmental governance as …the collection of legislative, executive and 
administrative functions, processes and instruments used by any organ of state [and the private sector] to ensure 
sustainable behaviour by all as far as governance of activities, products, services, processes and tools are 
concerned.   
8 A specific weakness of the South African EIA system mentioned by Wood is ‘the problem of crippling 
under-funding and under-staffing of provincial and local authorities means that they must rely on the complaints 
of neighbours and the integrity of developers and their consultants for information about non-compliance.  M 
Kidd and FP Retief ‘Environmental Assessment’, in HA Strydom and ND King (eds) Environmental 
Management in South Africa (2009) at 1030, argues that ‘this still holds true today’ and also mention that ‘even 
where there are complaints, authorities are sometimes reluctant to take steps to address such problems due to the 
lack of capacity or other reasons that are less clear.  The setting of conditions, therefore, presupposes the 
enforcement of such conditions and absence of monitoring seriously undermines the entire system.’ 
Furthermore, F Craigie et al ‘Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Institutions’ in A Paterson and LJ 
Kotzé (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) at 101 
concludes the chapter by stating: ‘Finally, a discussion of the institutions responsible for undertaking 
environmental compliance and enforcement functions would not be complete without reflecting on the serious 
challenge regarding resource challenge regarding resource and capacity constraints... there is a pressing need to 
increase the number and geographical spread of such officials.’ 
9 Section 24(1) states that ‘...the potential impact on the environment of listed activities must be considered, 
investigated, assessed and reported to the competent authority…’ 
10 In response to the importance of follow-up, many countries in Africa (see ECA n(4) at 46-47) and the rest 
of the world (see Morrison-Saunders and Arts (n1) at 154-220) have legislated or put in place different 
procedures (apart from the ECO function) to guide the implementation of the EMP and/or conditions of the EA.   
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relation to contents and conditions of EAs; regulation 37 (1) of the EIA regulations) 12 states 
that ‘an authorisation must specify- (d) the conditions subject to which the activity may be 
undertaken including conditions determining- (ii) requirements for the management, 
monitoring and reporting of the impacts of the activity on the environment throughout the life 
cycle of the activity as contained in the approved environmental management programme’.  
These EAs are the principle mechanism for compliance and enforcement in terms of 
implementing Chapter 5 of the NEMA.13  The enforcement of these conditions once set, 
however, is frequently not carried out effectively.14 
One of the international best practice principles of EIA is that the process should be credible 
meaning that it ‘should be carried out with professionalism, rigor, fairness, objectivity, 
impartiality and balance, and be subject to independent checks and verification’. 15  The role 
of the ECO fits the latter part of this principle especially. In other parts of the world, 
especially Hong Kong16 and Canada,17 provision is made for independent monitoring and 
auditing agencies to oversee follow-up of EIA decisions and mitigation implementation by 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Roles of an ECO may include (if considering some roles contained in EAs): oversee and monitor 
adherence to EMP conditions; implementation of the construction and EMP conditions; ensuring compliance 
with the relevant conditions contained in the EA; ensuring mitigation measures are complied with; and induction 
of all contractors on contents of the EMP and EA. 
12 Government Notice R548 in Government Gazette 33306 of 18 June 2009. 
13 Chapter 5 deals with IEM and s 24(c) requires that ‘the holder and any person issued with an EA must 
manage all environmental impacts (i) in accordance with his or her approved environmental management 
programme, where appropriate;’ and in terms of s 24(d) ‘must monitor and audit compliance with the 
requirements of the environmental management programme’.  See also DEA (n2) at 16 and 18. 
14 See Wood ‘Pastiche or Postiche? Environmental Impact assessment in South Africa’ (1999) South African 
Geographical Journal at 56 as quoted by Kidd and Retief (n8) at 1030; and DEA (n2) at 9, which state that 
‘officials from the Department continue to detect non-compliances with conditions of authorizations issued to 
para-statals such as the Central Energy Fund, Transnet, Armscor, Aventura Resorts, Denel, Eskom, 
Johannesburg Water, Portnet, Necsa, Safcol, PetroSA, and Transtel (and others)’.  The DEA also mentions that 
‘the Department is beginning to identify institutions and persons that continue to contravene environmental 
legislation…’ and that in terms of verification of EIA findings the DWA (n2) at 18 states that ‘the EIA process 
did not effectively identify all impacts associated with proposed activities.  This was particularly true of the 
construction and commissioning phases of the projects…’ 
15 See IAIA (n1) at 1-4. 
16 In Hong Kong, the proponent is required to appoint an Independent Environmental Checker (IEC) who 
audits the overall Environmental Monitoring and Audit program required under the EIA Ordinance to be put in 
place by the Environmental Team appointed by the proponent. The IEC must have at least seven years of 
professional experience and be independent of the proponent and Environmental Team.  See E Au and S Hui 
‘Learning by doing: EIA follow-up in Hong Kong’, in Morrison-Saunders and J Arts (n1) at 197-223. 
17 For major EIA projects in Canada, an Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency (as in the case of 
the Ekati Diamond Mine) is established to report on the activities of both the proponent and government with 
respect to project implementation and environmental management. See W Ross ‘The independent environmental 
watchdog: a Canadian experiment in EIA follow-up’, in Morrison-Saunders and Arts (n1) at 178-196. 
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persons employed to operate independently of the developer (even though they are required 
to pay for these services).  In Canadian practice, independence is also required from 
government too. In Western Australian practice, it is the EIA regulator responsible for 
designing and administering the EIA process (including follow-up) as well as providing 
publicly disclosed advice and recommendations to the Minister for Environment on each 
project assessed prior to the approval decision being made (by the Minister) that is 
established as being statutorily independent of government. This means that the Minister is 
not able to direct their activities.18  The ongoing review of EIAM in South Africa reiterates 
the importance of having ‘an independent third party with no vested interest in the outcome 
of a particular activity [as being] the best way of implemented an effective compliance and 
enforcement regime.’19 
One of the findings to emerge from the research conducted for this paper is that, despite the 
ECO industry being active in South Africa for almost twenty years,20 there are still 
significantly differing views between practitioners on the role and the independence of an 
ECO.21  The resultant implications of these differing views may include: substantial variation 
across EA conditions between individual authorisations; appointment of inexperienced or 
inappropriately qualified persons to carry out the ECO functions; lack of trust in the 
effectiveness of these compliance monitoring and implementation functions; poor 
communication and reporting channels between the developer, the relevant authorities and 
Interested and Affected Parties (I&APs) and the ECO; poor enforcement support from 
                                                 
18 Section 8 of the Environmental Protection Act 1986 (Western Australia) establishes the statutory 
independence of the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) stating that: ‘neither (a) the Authority; nor (b) 
the Chairman [of the EPA], shall be subject to the direction of the [Environment] Minister’.  This feature of EIA 
in Western Australia is a particular strength noted in an international comparative evaluation of a dozen or so 
EIA systems around the world.  See C Wood ‘Lessons from Comparative Practice’ (1999) 20, Built 
Environment at 332‐344.  A full account of the EPA's approach to follow-up in Western Australia can be found 
in A Morrison-Saunders, B Jenkins and J Bailey ‘EIA follow-up and adaptive management’, in Morrison-
Saunders and Arts (n1) at 154-177. 
19 DEA (n2) at 16 and 25. 
20 Barker as quoted by Wood (n1) at 255, noted in 1996 already that monitoring conditions were 
implemented in approvals under the voluntary IEM procedure of the 1992 IEM guidelines of South Africa.  
These conditions often included amongst others; requirements for an environmental management plan to be 
implemented and independently audited, for an on-site environmental control officer to be appointed during 
construction and for subcontractors to be penalised if environmental safeguards were violated.  However, these 
guideline requirements of post-decision monitoring were not included in the first era of mandatory EIA 
regulations of 1997.  Hill, as quoted by Wood (n1) at 255, felt that ‘the lack of regulations on EIA follow-up 
constitutes a retrograde step for environmental management in South Africa’. 
21 These roles may range from independent compliance monitoring, auditing and reporting to hands-on post 
decision implementation and enforcement.  See roles identified (n11) above. 
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government; and poor implementation of the EMP and EA conditions; all of which ultimately 
contribute to failure in compliance monitoring and enforcement on a construction site.22 
The confusion surrounding the role of an ECO may be fuelled by the fact that the ECO 
concept, although widely used the past 20 years, has not been explicitly and formally defined 
in South African legislation and where it was attempted the definitions do not reflect 
practitioner sentiment and reality.  For example, the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF) identifies in their Environmental Best Practice Specifications for 
Construction various role players in monitoring and auditing including an Environmental 
Officer (EO); an ECO; and an Independent Environmental Control Officer (IECO), each with 
various functions and roles during construction.23  The primary role of an ECO as viewed by 
DWAF is to “act as quality controller regarding all environmental concerns’ and suggests that 
the ECO in this respect should: conduct periodic site inspections; attend regular site 
meetings; pre-empt problems and suggest mitigation, verify monitoring reports submitted by 
the EO and be available to advise on incidental issues that arise.  DWAF also state that an 
ECO should conduct compliance audits.  However, auditing forms only a part of a much 
wider compliance monitoring and enforcement programme on a construction site and should 
not be conducted by an ECO in situations where the ECO is responsible for implementation 
as this compromises independence.24  In this situation an independent “external auditor” 
                                                 
22 Also refer to factors contributing to failure in compliance monitoring and enforcement as listed by DEA 
(n2) 1-44. 
23 The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) aims to define roles for efficient implementation 
of Performance Specifications, effective Monitoring and Auditing for construction or implementation of a 
project in their Environmental Best Practice Specifications for Construction.  DWAF identifies various role 
players in monitoring and auditing including: the land owner/custodian of the land; the developer / 
implementing agent, environmental consultant; project manager; design engineer; environmental planner; 
contractor; site engineer; environmental officer; environmental control officer; independent environmental 
control officer; operator of water supply and/or infrastructure; and environmental manager.  An interesting 
statement by DWAF is that the contractor and EO are answerable to the ECO, thus implying that the ECO has a 
position of authority.  On competence DWAF recommend that the role of an ECO be fulfilled by any person 
(department or professional service provider), well versed in environmental studies and construction processes.  
See Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) Integrated Environmental Management Series – 
Environmental Best Practice Specifications: Construction (3rd ed 2005) at 48-51.   
24 Audit is defined as ‘systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining audit evidence and 
evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which the audit criteria are fulfilled.  Independence: being the 
basis for the impartiality of the audit and objectivity of the audit conclusions; is viewed by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) as one of the principles of auditing and state that ‘auditors should be 
independent of the activity being audited and also be free from bias and conflict of interest.’ See South African 
National Standards (SANS) SANS 19011: 2003 / ISO 19011: 2002 – Guidelines for quality and/or 
environmental management systems auditing (2003) at 1-4.  Furthermore, the ISO notes that in terms of an 
independent audit ‘in many cases, particularly smaller organisations, independence can be demonstrated by the 
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should perform the auditing function and DWAF compares an IECO to an external auditor.  
Again the latter comparison in terminology that adds to the confusion as an auditor is an 
individual skilled and competent with auditing principles and practice whereas an IECO may 
not necessarily be.    Moreover, in terms of compliance monitoring,25 the competent authority 
may require a person in question (a person that contravened or failed to comply with a 
condition of an environmental authorisation), to appoint an independent person approved by 
the authority to perform an environmental audit.  Does this mean an IECO or an external 
auditor?  Ultimately the situation regarding the abovementioned is unclear.   
Furthermore, the NEMA, defines an environmental assessment practitioner (hereafter EAP), 
when used in Chapter 5 as ‘the individual responsible for the planning, management and 
coordination of environmental impact assessments, strategic environmental assessments, 
environmental management plans or any other appropriate environmental instruments 
introduced through regulations.’  This might be interpreted to imply that an EAP is deemed to 
be an ECO, if the ECO is responsible for the management, implementation and/or 
coordination of an EMP.  However, the EAP definition do not include ECOs having the role 
of monitoring compliance to EA and EMP conditions, as monitoring is not included in the 
ambit of the definition.  The EIA regulations also define independent in relation to an EAP 
and include in this description ‘a person compiling a specialist report or undertaking a 
specialised process…’ The latter may include compliance monitoring as a specialised process 
and thus imply that an ECO may be deemed to be an EAP.26  However, this argument is 
contradicted by the Certificate Board for Environmental Assessment Practitioners for South 
Africa (hereafter CBEAPSA) which states that: ‘an EAP is someone who, co-ordinates, 
manages, and integrated various components of environmental assessment throughout the 
planning process. CBEAPSA also adds that the term does not apply to specialists in particular 
fields who may be involved in, or asked to give input to, particular stages of an 
environmental assessment from the perspective of his/her field of expertise. 27  
                                                                                                                                                        
freedom from responsibility for the activity being audited.’  See South African National Standards SANS 14001: 
2005 / ISO 14001:2004 Environmental Management Systems – Requirements with guidance for us. (2nd ed 2005) 
at 3. 
25 Regulation 69 of Government Notice R548 (n12). 
26 According to GN R 543 a “specialised process” means a process to obtain information which- 
(a) is not readily available without undertaking the process; and 
(b) is necessary for informing an assessment or evaluation of the impacts of an activity, and  
includes risk assessment and cost benefit analysis. 
27 Certification Board for Environmental Assessment Practitioners of South Africa (CBEAPSA). 2012.  
Information Booklet at 7. Available at www.eapsa.co.za/downloads.html (accessed 05 June 2012). 
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The DEA also argues that relatively less compliance and enforcement authority activity are 
made by government during project implementation and operations and that the later 
compliance and enforcement function will be ultimately driven by Specific Environmental 
Management Acts (hereafter SEMAs) such as the NEMAQA and the NEMWA.28  
Designation of control officers in SEMAs are, therefore, provided for with the tasks of: 
working towards the development and introduction of cleaner technologies; identifying 
measures in respect of waste minimisation; taking all reasonable measures to ensure 
compliance; and promptly reporting on non-compliances to licence conditions.  For example 
an ‘Emission Control Officer’29 should be designated by a licence holder in terms of s 48(1) 
of the NEMAQA, if required by an air quality officer.30  A similar SEMA compliance officer 
function is the ‘Waste Management Control Officer’, which should be designated by a holder 
of a waste management licence in terms of s 58(1) of the NEMWA, if required by a waste 
management officer.31  Although some roles and competencies are alluded to, both the 
‘Emission and Waste Control Officer’ concepts have also not been defined by this particular 
SEMAs or any other policy.  These SEMA designated control officers also raise questions 
such as: may an ECO designated under NEMA also act as a SEMA control officer during 
construction phase of a project?; is a SEMA designated control officer competent to act as an 
ECO?; and what are the overlapping responsibilities and timeframes of these different control 
                                                 
28 See DEA (n2) at 17-18. 
29 H Von Blottnitz, C Fedorsky and W Bray in in HA Strydom and ND King (eds) Environmental 
Management in South Africa (2009) at 579, notes that in terms of s 48(2)(a) to (c) of the NEMAQA, the 
emission control officer must have the requisite competence to work toward the development and introduction 
of cleaner production technologies and practices and should take reasonable steps to ensure compliance by the 
holder with the licence conditions and requirements, and promptly report on non-compliance to the licensing 
authority. See also section 48 of the NEMAQA for roles 
30 In terms of section 1(1) of the NEMAQA an air quality officer means an officer appointed (by 
government) in terms of section 14 as an air quality officer.  This is an appointee in the DEA responsible for co-
ordinating matters pertaining to waste management in the national government. 
31 In terms of s 1 of the NEMWA, the waste management officer means ‘a waste management officer 
designated in terms of section 10’.  This is also an appointee in the DEA responsible for co-ordinating matters 
pertaining to waste management in the national government.  Section 58 of the Act requires that a waste control 
officer must-  
(a) Work toward the development and introduction of clean production technologies and practices to 
achieve waste minimisation; 
(b) Identify and submit potential measures in respect of waste minimisation, including the reduction, 
recovery, re-use and recycling of waste to the waste management licence holder and the licencing 
authority; 
(c) Take all reasonable steps to ensure compliance by the holder of the waste management licence 
with the licence conditions and requirements and the provisions of this Act; and 
(d) Promptly report any non-compliance with any licence conditions or requirements or provisions of 
this Act to the licensing authority through the most effective means reasonably available. 
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officers?  These unresolved issues regarding terminologies are likely to add to the confusion 
regarding the expected roles of the NEMA designated ECOs. 
In light of the previous discussions on the independence and role of an ECO, this paper 
reports on an initial attempt to define; by way of evaluating environmental practitioner 
perspectives in a survey, what the role is of an ECO in the compliance monitoring and 
enforcement effort during the construction phase of a project is or ideally should be.  This 
paper also reveals practitioner perspectives on key roles, core need for and needs of the 
industry before concluding with reflections on these issues.  The lessons distilled from the 
survey may serve to aid legislators, legal practitioners, decision-makers, EAPs, developers, 
ECOs, I&APs and other role-players in understanding the role of the ECO and in being able 
to work towards more effective implementation of EAs in South Africa into the future. 
 
2 Study context and methodology 
The principle author, as an employee of the Centre for Environmental Management (CEM), 32 
was sub-contracted as an ECO for a period of five years from September 2006 until August 
2011 for a large-scale mall development project in Potchefstroom.  During this period the 
project as well as the ECO function was used as a best-practice environmental enforcement 
case example33 and practical exercise application for various environmental courses34 hosted 
by the CEM.  In these courses heated debates and discussions were entertained between 
practitioners and presenters with regards to post-decision environmental compliance 
monitoring, implementation, and enforcement of EMP and EA conditions and at the heart of 
                                                 
32 The core activities of the CEM are to build capacity and facilitate change by amongst others: developing 
and conducting flexible and appropriate training programmes in environmental and occupational health and 
safety management and related fields. See Centre for Environmental Management (CEM), 2011 Yearbook 
(Potchefstroom 2011).   
33 According to JG Nel and JA Wessels How to use Voluntary, Self-regulatory and Alternative 
Environmental Compliance Tools: Some Lessons Learned’ (2010) 13 PER 189 at 65, the MooiRivier Mall 
development aimed to integrate a seamless portfolio of environmental enforcement tools designed to deliver 
sustained, reliable and demonstrated legal compliance throughout the life cycle of the project.   
34 Courses that used and are still using the MooiRivier Mall development as a case example and practical 
exercise includes: Introduction to Environmental Management – An Overview of Principles, Tools and Issues 
(CEM-01.1); Environmental Impact Assessment: A Practical Approach (CEM-05.1); Introduction to Integrated 
Waste Management for Environmental Managers (CEM-06.2.1); Water Quality Monitoring: Principles, 
Approaches and Techniques (CEM-06.4.3) and the newly developed Post-decision Environmental Monitoring 
and Enforcement: An Introduction to the Role and Responsibilities of an Environmental Control Officer (CEM-
05.1.5). See CEM (n32). 
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the discussions were the role and independence of an ECO.  As a result of the latter and 
various requests for training by organisations on the particular subject, the CEM started 
developing a five day course in 2007.35  During 12-16 September 2011 at the North-West 
University in Potchefstroom, the course with the theme ‘Post-decision Environmental 
Monitoring and Enforcement: An Introduction to the Role and responsibilities of an 
Environmental Control Officer (CEM-05.1.5)’ (hereafter ‘the course’) was successfully 
presented to 29 students from various organisations by 11 presenters from the CEM and other 
leading role-players36 in the ECO industry.37 
We identified this rare and historical gathering of 40 environmental practitioners interested in 
and involved with the ECO industry as a unique opportunity to gather data for an 
interpretive-empirical research evaluation38 of current perceptions on the role and 
independence of the ECO function.  Our primary means of data collection was by way of a 
survey questionnaire of all parties involved (presenters and participants) in the course.39 
 
                                                 
35 As a result of the factors mentioned above, the principle author developed a keen interest in the ECO topic 
and enrolled for a PhD at the Department of Geography and Environmental Management, North-West 
University in 2011 and is currently conducting an in-depth investigation of the role and independence of ECOs. 
36 The key organisations involved in the development and delivery of the course were: Trans-Caledon 
Tunnel Authority (TCTA); NCC Environmental Services (Pty) Ltd.; Department of Geography and 
Environmental Management of the North-West University; SE Solutions (Pty) Ltd and Ecoleges.  
37 Although the course is probably the most comprehensive ECO training to be conducted in South Africa to 
date, we acknowledge that other training courses are currently provided by training service providers such as the 
one day ‘Environmental Control Officer (ECO) & Contractor Training for Environmental Management Plan 
(EMP) Implementation’ by Future Works. Details are available at www.futureworks.co.za (accessed 31 
September 2011).  
38 WL Neuman Social Research Methods, Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (2000) at 72, states that 
‘interpretive research tries to capture reality as it is, namely as seen and experienced by the respondents’ and 
also mentions that ‘for the interpretive researcher, social reality is based on people’s definitions of it’.  
Furthermore, M David and CD Sutton Social Research – the Basics (2004) at 361, defines empirical research as 
‘the collection of data (by various means), rather than drawing conclusions only from the manipulation of 
theoretical propositions’. 
39 Surveys as commonly used to great effect within the EIA research field to understand how practice 
unfolds in a legal or policy context.  See for example; A Morrison-Saunders and J Baily ‘Practitioner 
Perspectives on the Role of Science in Environmental Impact Assessment (2003) 31(6) Environmental 
Management at 683-695; S Waldeck, A Morrison-Saunders & D Annandale. ‘Professional Practice: 
Effectiveness of non-legal EIA guidance from perspective of consultants in Western Australia’ (2003) 21(3) 
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 251-256; A Morrison-Saunders and B Sadler ‘The art and science of 
impact assessment: results of a survey of IAIA members’ (2010) 28(1) Impact Assessment and Project 
Appraisal 77-82; and V Sok et al ‘Addressing Climate Change through Environmental Impact Assessment: 
International Perspectives form a Survey of IAIA Members’ (Unpublished) Scheduled for publication in Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal 29(4) in December 2011. 
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2.1 Survey design 
The survey questionnaire was distributed to the practitioners at the commencement of the 
course40 as well as the presenters, and other identified role-players in the industry during the 
course to probe participants’ understanding of and perspectives on the ECO industry. 
For the purpose of this paper, two aspects of the original questionnaire41 are presented; these 
address the role of the industry and independence of the industry.  The parts of the 
questionnaire used in the survey relevant to these fundamentally important issues for the 
industry are reproduced in Box 1.  They are divided into three components namely; 
demographic data, open or qualitative questions, and closed or qualitative questions. 
Box 1. Survey questions concerning the role and independence of an ECO 
Note: the numbering below do not indicate the original sequence of the survey questions. 
Demographic data 
1. Approximately how much of your working time do you spend directly on ECO-related activities? (Choose 1 
only)  
None / Up to 25% / Between 25 and 50% / Between 50 and 75% / Between 75 and 100% / 100% 
2. How many years have you worked in the ECO industry? (Choose 1 only)  
 None / Up to 5 years / 5 to 10 years / 10 to 15 years / more than 15 years 
3. What best describes your role in the ECO industry? (Choose 1 only) 
 Academic research / Competent authority / Consultant (EAP) / Developer (Proponent) / Non-governmental 
Organisation (NGO) / ECO 
Open/Qualitative Questions 
4. List up to five key roles of an ECO. 
5. In one sentence explain what you consider to be the core need for the ECO industry? 
6. Explain the importance of independence of an ECO. 
Closed/Quantitative Questions 
[In the following closed or quantitative structured questions, respondents were asked to rate each of the statements below 
according to the supplied response scale (strongly agree, agree, partly agree, partly disagree, disagree, strongly disagree, 
unable to judge).  They were also asked to respond on the basis of; 7 their own opinion what should be; and 8 their own 
experience of ECO practices].  
7. In your opinion an ECO should be independent of? 
 a) Developer. 
 b) Competent authority. 
 c) Environmental Assessment Practitioner (EAP). 
 d) Interested and Affected Parties (I&APs). 
8. In your experience of ECO practice an ECO is independent of? 
                                                 
40 The idea of the survey was to obtain the perspectives of the course participants before being influenced by 
opinions, theories and ideas from the presenters and the training materials. 
41 The original questionnaire developed for the survey contained eight components: general perspectives on 
ingredients for effective post-decision monitoring and enforcement; the need for ECOs; the role of the industry; 
independence of the industry; the role of ECOs in influencing behaviour; future directions of the industry; 
demographic data and any further comments.  A large volume of data was generated on these topics, in excess 
of what can be presented and analysed in this paper.   
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 a) Developer. 
 b) Competent authority. 
 c) Environmental Assessment Practitioner (EAP). 
 d) Interested and Affected Parties (I&APs). 
Component one pertains to the demographic characteristics of survey participants (Questions 
1-3) concerning percentage working time, experience and role as an ECO.   
The second component consists of a series of open or free choice questions (Questions 4-6) 
which yielded content rich qualitative data derived from written responses.  While a diverse 
range of views were presented, common themes emerged.  Rather than simply summarise and 
generalise these themes, a selection of un-edited comments of practitioners relevant to each 
theme is presented so as to capture the 'voice' of survey participants. 
The third component consists of closed or defined choice questions (Questions 7-8), which 
yielded a quantitative data set derived from seven point rating Likert response scales42 
relevant to independence of the ECO industry.  A continuum of ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly 
Disagree’ and an option of ‘Unable to Judge’ were used. This data is content-simple but 
structured and readily analysed to extrapolate frequency and distribution of practitioner views 
on the particular matter.43 
Through surveying practitioners in the field, the intention was to understand how the current 
legal provisions in South Africa have been interpreted and applied in practice. This provides 
an opportunity to reflect back on the utility of the current legal framework and what might 
need amendment in the future; a topic addressed at the end of the paper. 
 
                                                 
42 Quantitative data was obtained in the questionnaire through the deployment of closed ended questions in 
the form of a Likert scale (rating scales are sometimes referred to as Likert scales), constructed in order to 
provide information on the practitioner’s opinions and attitudes on the topic of ‘independence’.  See David and 
Sutton (n38) at 167; as well as PD Leedy and JE Ormond Practical Research – Planning and Design (9th ed 
2010) at 189.  The scale was constructed through the assignment of two statements (see 7 and 8) on ‘ECO 
independence to role-players’ (or scale items) followed by the same set of responses for each item indicating 
varying degrees of agreement with or disagreement with the statement.  The responses entailed a seven-point 
Likert scale, with the end point of the scale a non attitude choice, termed ‘Unable to Judge’.  By offering a non-
attitude choice, it was possible to identify those without positions, therefore, addressing the difficulty of 
aggregation of ratings in the middle range between ‘Partly Agree and Partly Disagree’.  See David and Sutton 
(n36) at 167.  
43 Non-numerical data derived from the seven-point Likert scales enabled the strength of opinion of the 
practitioners on the topic of ‘independence to role-players’ to be determined.  See T Greenfield Research 
Methods – Guidance for Postgraduates (1996) at 54 and 182. 
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3 Survey results and key findings 
The response rate in the survey was relatively high due to the ‘captive’ audience at the course 
and the survey was returned by 30 of the 40 practitioners involved in the course.44  
Additionally, the survey was also posted online to two additional practitioners and 20 
completed surveys were returned due to one of the practitioners45 distributing the survey to 
colleagues involved with the ECO industry.46 
 
3.1 Demographic data 
The 50 participants for the three demographic questions (Questions 1 to 3 in Box 1) revealed 
the following characteristics: 
  A large proportion of the respondents (84%) of the respondents spent some time 
directly on ECO activities, with some 20% spending more than 75% of their working 
time on these. 
  The survey was completed by relatively inexperienced ECO practitioners; with most 
(66%) having less than 5 years experience and a further 20% either indicating no 
response to the experience question or having no ECO experience.  Only 8% of the 
respondents indicated having ‘5 to 10 years’ experience and only 6% of the 
practitioners responded to have ‘10 to 15 years’ experience.  No respondent 
practitioners had more than 15 years experience in the ECO industry.  Given that EIA 
practices have been in place in South Africa for over 40 years (since early 1970s), 
                                                 
44 It was acknowledged at the commencement of this research, that it was not possible to collect data from 
the entirety of the population of environmental practitioners involved in the ECO industry.  As verified with 
Glaudin Kruger (IAIA Secretariat) on 25 October 2011, a variable total of 1076 environmental practitioners are 
members of International Association of Impact Assessment - South African Affiliate and are involved in some 
way in the EIA industry.  Unfortunately there is currently no data or databases available that indicate how many 
practitioners are directly involved in the ECO industry (unlike the National Environmental Agency of 
Singapore’s list of 1747 active registered ECOs). 
Available at http://app2.nea.gov.sg/data/cmsresource/20110706896769665932.pdf (accessed 26 October 2011).  
As a result purposive sampling (also termed theoretical sampling) was chosen to select sample units, which in 
this case were the course participants.  According to David and Sutton (n36) at 152 ‘purposive sampling is a 
form of sampling technique available to social researchers to select sample units according to their knowledge 
and opinion to be ones appropriate to the topic area’. 
45 Managing Director of NCC Environmental Services (Pty) Ltd. 
46 The data generated by these practitioners is relevant for the research topic as the experience of the 
practitioners make them appropriate respondents to the research topic.  See David and Sutton (n38) at 152.  
Furthermore, additional surveys were returned, which will be used in further research on the ECO topic. 
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these results underscore points made previously, that implementation and follow-up 
aspects of EAs have in large part been neglected and also the emerging nature of the 
ECO industry. 
  With respect to role in the ECO industry, most respondents were ‘Practicing ECOs’ 
(46%), followed by ‘Consultants / EAPs’ (18%), ‘Developer / Proponent’ (16%), 
‘Competent authority’ (14%), and lastly ‘Academic’ (2%) with 4% having no 
response to the question. 
 
3.2 The role of environmental control officers 
This section of the paper illustrates the key roles of the industry and the core need for the 
industry, before concluding with the needs of the industry as identified by the participating 
practitioners. 
 
3.2.1 Key roles of the ECO industry 
Regarding the roles within the ECO industry (Question 4 in Box 1) the practitioners were 
asked to list five key roles in order of priority with 1 as the highest priority.  A total of 226 
statements were made on the roles that an ECO may have.  The key roles listed by the 
practitioners are clustered into categories and are listed below in order of highest to lowest 
number of times recorded:  
Table 1: Key roles of the ECO industry in descending order of number of times 
recorded 
Rating Category 
No. of times 
recorded 
1 Compliance monitoring 48 
2 Implementation and enforcement 34 
3 Advising and/or consulting 27 
4 Ensuring legal compliance 26 
5 Reporting 21 
6 Communicating and/or liaising 17 
7 Raising awareness and/or educating 13 
8 Auditing 12 
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Rating Category 
No. of times 
recorded 
9 Environmental protection and sustainable development 7 
9 Risk assessment and identification of environmental issues 7 
10 Independence 5 
11 Conflict management 2 
11 Document control 2 
12 Influencing behaviour 1 
12 Acting as a team player 1 
12 Providing assurance 1 
12 Driver for continual improvement 1 
12 Acting on behalf of government 1 
Compliance monitoring, which includes: the monitoring of activities; monitoring of 
enforcement actions; legal compliance monitoring; and inspections, were listed as the number 
one priority 18 (8%) times and was considered to be the top two ECO tasks a total of 30 
(13%) times.  Furthermore, being identified 48 times, monitoring contributes to a total of 
21% of the total listed roles that an ECO may have. 
The clustering of the category ‘implementation and enforcement’ (which was mentioned 34 
times and is thus being considered the second highest priority role of ECOs) provided to be a 
challenge as the practitioners listed various roles that deals with implementation and 
enforcement.  For example, the following words or phrases were provided: enforcement; 
management; implementation of law; developing method statements; approving method 
statements; regulating; controlling; and preventing impacts, emergencies and incidents.  
Interestingly, in contrast and in addition to our responses, the DEA47 view enforcement as the 
actions required to maintain compliance.  Therefore one may add ‘ensuring compliance’ to 
the category of implementation and enforcement.  If this is done, it will mean that 60 (27%) 
of the responding practitioners viewed implementation and enforcement (including ensuring 
legal compliance) as the primary role of an ECO.  
A role mentioned by 27 (12%) practitioners was the ‘advisory function’ of an ECO.  
Practitioners were of the opinion that an ECO role is to add value in a project by facilitating 
and assisting role-players in the interpretation of EA and EMP conditions, as well as other 
legal requirements.  Additional noteworthy roles identified in this category is consulting with 
and providing guidance for contractors to minimise environmental impacts. 
                                                 
47 DEA (n2) at 12.  
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The role of ‘reporting’ on issues such as: legal compliance; incidents; and non-compliances; 
were mentioned by 21 (9%) practitioners and was followed closely by ‘communicating 
and/or liaising’ identified 17 (8%) times.  In the latter category practitioners viewed an ECO 
as playing an important role in mediating differences and facilitating better relationships 
between role players such as government and developers.  It must be noted that the line of 
and/or method of reporting and communicating is a key component of the ECO function and 
should be designed correctly by the developer, environmental implementation agent or any 
other person/s of authority to enhance the reporting and communication ‘voice’ of an ECO on 
a project.  
The practitioners also listed ‘raising awareness and/or educating’ 13 (6%) times and stated 
that an ECO should promote issues such as environmental protection and sustainability (also 
refer to rating number 8 where ‘promoting environmental protection and sustainable 
development were listed 7 times).  Some practitioners also stated that, ‘where practicable 
ECOs should train contractors’. 
Only 12 (5%) of the practitioners viewed auditing as a role to be fulfilled by an ECO.  This 
may be attributed to practitioner’s views that independence or ‘freedom’ from responsibility 
for the specific activity being audited cannot be guaranteed in practice.  Additional to the 
latter is that ECOs may not necessarily be competent to conduct audits and a final factor to 
take cognisance of in considering the results is that many practitioners do not accurately 
distinguish between inspections and audits.   
Finally, at the bottom of the ratings were: environmental protection and sustainable 
development 7 (3%); risk assessment and identification of environmental issues 7 (3%); 
independence 3 (1%); conflict management 2 (less than 1%); and document control 2 (also 
less than 1%) followed by: influencing behaviour: acting as a team player; providing 
assurance; driver for continual improvement; and acting on behalf of government identified 
once respectively. 
 
3.2.2 The core need for the ECO industry 
Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 built on the roles identified in Table 1 and reflect on the written 
interpretation of the open Questions 5 in component 2 of the survey regarding the core need 
for the ECO industry.  The qualitative responses are grouped according to the specific theme 
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related to the questions posed in the survey.  The general analyses of main findings are 
presented on a question-by-question basis followed by a presentation of key statements in the 
original words of the practitioners.  The latter is done to convey the essence and passion of 
the practitioners.  As a large volume of responses were received, this section will only focus 
on selected usable and unambiguous responses.48   
Question 5 of the survey was interpreted by the practitioners as having one of two meanings; 
firstly: ‘what the ECO industry is needed for’ (this was the original intent of the survey 
question); and secondly ‘what is needed for the ECO industry’.  Although the question was 
interpreted differently by the practitioners both categories are valid for the study and will be 
reflected on as separate themes in this section and in section 3.2.3 respectively. 
The results of the category: ‘what the ECO industry is needed for’ indicates that 13 (26%) of 
the practitioners regarded compliance monitoring of EMP and EA conditions as a core need 
for the industry, while 8 (16%) respondents regarded ensuring legal compliance and 5 (10%) 
enforcing conditions on a site as a core need for the ECO industry.  Thus, more than 50% of 
the responding practitioners were of the opinion that the ECO function directly corresponds 
to the need for legal compliance monitoring and enforcement on a site.  This correlates 
strongly with the results of Question 4 as presented in Table 1.  Apart from ensuring and 
enforcing legal compliance 7 (14%) respondents also regarded protection and conservation of 
the environment as core needs for ECOs (also see rating 8 in Table 1).  Furthermore, 6 (12%) 
of the practitioners deemed communication and reporting as central to the ECO function, (see 
ratings 4 & 5), while 6 (12%) were of the opinion that advising (other words used were; 
guidance, facilitate, make aware and coaching) developers on environmental issues is a core 
need for the industry (the advisory function was rated 3rd in Table 1).  In essence the results 
of Questions 4 and 5 correlate closely and reiterate the importance of these roles and the 
industry in general. 
Some of the statements made by the respondents on these topics are listed in Boxes (2 and 3), 
which are followed by a brief interpretation of what they may mean. 
Box 2: Perspectives on the need for the ECO industry 
‘ECOs need in essence to monitor and report on the implementation of EA and EMP requirements to facilitate 
the carrying forward of the intentions or requirements set out in the EMP and EA by creating a consequence to 
ignoring these requirements.’ 
                                                 
48 See also qualitative statements at the end of section 3.3 of the paper. 
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‘Aim at protecting the environment and monitor the project activities in terms of compliance with project 
management plan and other legislation.’ 
‘To ensure project compliance to National legislation, project EAs, EIA etc.’ 
‘Ensuring compliance conditions of ROD and monitoring non-compliance.’ 
‘Enforcement and ensure sustainable development.’ 
‘To enforce the conditions of the authorisation and EMP that was issued to the applicant and accepted by 
government.’ 
‘Ensuring environmental compliance through an independent party,..’ 
‘Independent post-decision monitoring and enforcement.’ 
‘An ECO is not a policeman’ 
The monitoring and reporting function according the practitioners is a form of warning 
system to inform the developers to the consequences of not complying with conditions.  The 
industry also focus (or aim) on protecting the environment by monitoring activities of 
projects of not only the project specific EA or EMP requirements but also other relevant 
environmental legislation.  Enforcement, ensuring compliance and sustainable development 
is also raised numerously by the participants.  The last perspective of an ECO should not be a 
‘policemen’ is interesting because a policing function may be negatively perceived by 
developers and contractors on a site, whereas more effective outcomes might be achieved if 
an ECO is seen to be working in collaboration with these workers.   
It is also necessary to compare the abovementioned perspectives as well as the roles 
identified and rated in Table 1 to the principle environmental aims enshrined in s 24 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (the Constitution) and section 4 of 
NEMA before concluding this section of the paper.  The Constitution, states that: ‘everyone 
has the right- (a) to an environment that is not harmful to his or her health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that- (i) prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development 
and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.’  
In essence, effective monitoring (see rating 1), implementation and enforcement (refer to 
rating 2) as well as ensuring legal compliance (rating 3) should give effect to the 
constitutional principles of preventing pollution, ecological degradation and securing 
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ecological development during the construction phase of a project (also see rating 8 that deals 
with environmental protection and sustainable development). 
If the NEMA is considered, section 4(a)(viii) of NEMA states that: ‘that negative impacts on 
the environment and on people's environmental rights be anticipated and prevented, and 
where they cannot be altogether prevented, are minimised and remedied.’.  Anticipation and 
prevention of impacts can only be done through proper environmental assessments such as 
EIAs during pre-construction and, thereafter, during construction and operation on a 
continuous basis through on-site risk assessments and identification of impacts (refer to rating 
8).  The identification of impacts and associated non-compliances during construction and 
operation can only be achieved through effective and efficient continuous monitoring 
programmes implemented by people (such as an ECO) that frequently visit a site (see 1).  In 
terms of rating 3, 5 and 6 (advising, liaison and raising awareness) section 4(f) of NEMA 
states that ‘The participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental 
governance must be promoted,...’ and section 4(h) requires that ‘Community wellbeing and 
empowerment must be promoted through environmental education, the raising of 
environmental awareness, the sharing of knowledge and experience and other appropriate 
means.  All of these legal requirements relevant to the roles of an ECO are given a mandate 
by section 4(e) which requires that ‘Responsibility for the environmental health and safety 
consequences of a ....project,....or activity exists throughout its life cycle’ which includes the 
construction phase.   
Finally and as stated previously, EAs and related conditions issued under section 24 of the 
NEMA (see also regulation 37(1) of GN R543 as discussed above) are the principle 
mechanism for compliance and enforcement and hence the implementation of Chapter 5 of 
NEMA.  Legal compliance monitoring (rating 1) and ensuring legal compliance (rating 3) by 
implementation and enforcement (rating 2) as primary roles of an ECO should thus, in 
practice, be giving effect to Chapter 5 of the NEMA. 
In summary, the perspectives of the practitioners do reflect the intended implementation of 
the legal provisions contained in the Constitution and the NEMA through the ECO industry.  
The current legal framework would also appear to be useful in relation to providing legal 
support for the ECO industry and thus not in need of amendment.  However, the EIA 
regulations specifically may need amendment to adopt specific ECO roles and thus reflect 
best practice such as the Emissions and Waste Control Officer duties and competency 
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requirements in the applicable SEMAs.  Lastly, it is essential that the legal intentions and the 
method of implementation thereof through an external enforcement or control function such 
as an ECO should be consistently reflected in EA conditions (being the principle mechanism 
for compliance and enforcement during construction phase) to avoid confusion on the issue 
of independence and roles. 
 
3.2.3 Needs of the ECO industry 
In the context of how to fulfil their roles efficiently and effectively the practitioners identified 
needs of the industry.  With regards to this category 15 (30%) of the 50 practitioners had 
concerns with the competency (experience and training) of the industry and some of the 
noteworthy perspectives are reflected in Box 3 below:   
Box 3: Perspectives on competency 
‘A very good understanding of natural systems and ecology is key together with a very practical hands on 
approach.’ 
‘Passionate, educated people who put the environment first and are guided by sustainable development.’ 
‘ECO that is knowledgeable not only in the environmental aspects of a particular activity, but to be informed 
and experienced with the engineering, and construction requirements for the said activities.’ 
‘Knowledge is required so that ECOs are able to assist with compliance and identify non-compliance.’  
‘ECOs became the competent environmental assurance practitioners who need to be well versed in a multitude 
of disciplines relating to environmental management.’ 
The clear picture that emerges from the comments in Box 3 is that respondents support an 
educated industry that is versed in environmental matters relating to sustainable development, 
ecology, legislation and construction and/or engineering requirements with a degree of 
experience in these subjects. 
Closely related to competency were the issue of registration and regulation of the industry by 
a body (or related criteria and standards) to ensure competent practitioners are performing the 
ECO function.  A total of 5 (10%) of the practitioners had a response on regulating the 
industry and some of these perspectives are recorded in Box 4 below:   
Box 4: Perspectives on the need for regulation of the industry 
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‘A system of registration to control the quality and learning of the ECO industry, with particular focus on the 
specific skill set required by ECOs.’ 
‘Registration of ECOs and regulation of the ECO function: i.e. most companies are doing ECO function and 
some of the ECOs don’t have any experience about what an ECO must do on a site.’ 
‘Screening of potential ECOs based on their skills, qualifications and core competencies. A set standard is 
required to maintain and/or create effective environmental monitoring & enforcement in South Africa.’ 
‘At this point in time there is a need for the industry to be formally regulated, with clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities to effectively monitor compliance on behalf of the competent authority, and criteria prescribing 
professional experience requirements.’ 
‘A board which ensures the independence and relative competency of an ECO would have a great advantage to 
the ECO industry.’ 
‘I think the core need for the ECO industry is to have an accredited body to ensure that they are recognised and 
adhere to high level of ethics and integrity and professionalism.’ 
A strong support for the regulation and registration of the industry is seen in the comments 
reproduced in Box 4.  This could be interpreted as people or organisations that invested in the 
quality and skills of their ECO product and that may want to protect their market share of the 
industry.  On the other hand they may also be altruistic comments made by concerned 
practitioners based on their experience in the field.  Interesting notions to also highlight is the 
call for a system for screening with related criteria and/or standards that clarifies roles and 
responsibilities. 
Apart from the core needs of competency, regulation, and independence of the industry 
(discussed in the next section 3.3), practitioners also identified ethics, integrity, honesty and 
professionalism, support from developers and government as well as clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities as being core needs of the industry. 
 
3.3 Independence of environmental control officers 
As stated in the introductory section of the paper, there are significantly differing views on 
the independence of an ECO as independence may be context specific to some agree and may 
mean different things to different stakeholders depending on circumstances.  However, a goal 
of this research was to seek some consensus on why independence is important and from 
whom independence are required.  In light of the latter, this section firstly outlines the profile 
derived from the perspectives of the practitioners on the two defined or closed-choice 
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statements of the survey pertaining to the issue of independence of the ECO industry from 
different role-players (see Questions 7–8 in Box 1).  The second part of the section is a 
written interpretation of the open question (Question 6) pertaining to the importance of 
independence of an ECO.  In relation to the question of whom an ECO should be independent 
of (see Question 7), the practitioners generally held independence of ECOs to all role players 
(as specified in the questionnaire) in high regard as the response to the question attest (see 
Figure 1-1).   
 
Figure 1-1 In your opinion an ECO should be independent of? 
Of the responding practitioners 44 (93%) were in agreement that ECOs should be 
independent of developers (68% where in strong agreement, 21% agreed and 4% partly 
agreed), whereas only 3 (6%) disagreed (2% partly disagreed, 2% disagreed and 2% strongly 
disagreed).  Furthermore (see Questions 7b-d), 38 (81%) of the respondents where in 
agreement that an ECO should be independent of the competent authority; 34 (75%) with 
relation to independence to EAPs; and lastly, 35 (77%) responded that ECOs should be 
independent of I&APs.  These results reflect the international positions (e.g. Hong Kong and 
Canada) outlined previously.  
In contrast, practitioners had a stark view regarding to whom an ECO should be independent 
of and what the situation is with regards to independence in their own experience.  If the rich 
and strong content on the issue of the importance of independence (see Question 6 and 
written responses reproduced in Box 5) as well as the rating of independence as a key role 
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(see rating 9 in Table 1) are considered, then it is obvious that independence of the ECO 
function is a serious concern that needs urgent attention and clarification from government 
and developers.  Reasons for the urgent attention and clarification of the independence of 
ECOs may include: to uncover and define a singular truth to the concept (if there is indeed 
one); to alleviate conflicts of interests between role-players due to different interpretations of 
the concept; to eliminate paralyzing uncertainty that may hamper effective compliance 
monitoring and enforcement; to streamline assessment and audit procedures; and to reinforce 
credibility of independent compliance monitoring and enforcement processes.  In light of the 
abovementioned reasons, independence of ECOs should therefore be, as far as reasonably 
possible, uniformly applied in EA and EMP requirements, service agreements and project 
governance structures. 
 
Figure 1-2 In your experience an ECO is independent of? 
Only 13 (28%) of the respondents in Figure 1-2 strongly agreed and 29 (63%) respondents in 
total were in agreement that ECOs are indeed independent of developers (see Question 8a).  
Furthermore: 29 (67%) where of the opinion that ECOs are independent of the competent 
authorities; 27 (62%) of EAPs; and 28 (63%) of I&APs. 
In terms of the written interpretation of the open question in component 2 of the survey 8 
(16%) of the practitioners identified independence as a core need (refer to Questions 5 of Box 
1), which underscores the strong support for independence to all role-players (see Figure 1-
1).  Very rich content was received from the practitioners but due to availability of space only 
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some of the more noteworthy perspectives on independence that simply could not be ignored 
are reproduced in Box 5. 
Box 5: Perspectives on the importance of independence 
‘An independent person/body monitoring the project while still being able to have clear communication with the 
legislator/Government departments as well as the developer to eliminate any potential grey areas/loop holes.’ 
‘Independence gives the ECO more authority.  Independence does not have to adhere to budget constraints and 
independence ensures that all shortfalls and non-compliances are reported.’ 
‘As an ECO, I have been asked by the developer to omit certain comments from my reports.  After coaching the 
developer as to what the role of the ECO actually is, they agreed that the reports should not be biased.’ 
‘Without independence, the inherent and fundamental principles, aims, functions and purposes of section 24 of 
the Constitution and all subsidiary legislation, notices, lists, best practice guidelines etc. become compromised. 
‘The environmental industry as a whole is often brought to question by various I&APs with respect of the 
independence of EAPs in general.  In order to improve the perception of the general public and to ensure the 
integrity of the industry, independence must be maintained.’ 
‘Complete independence; in other words not to be influenced by the client who pays your salary and maybe a 
system where the government pay or have a fund where the client pay into the fund.’ 
‘In my experience, if there are no requirements for independence, developers may appoint their own internal 
ECOs.  However, independence of the developer and competent authority is critical to ensure objective and fair 
representation of conditions on a site.’ 
‘As an independent compliance monitoring agent it is essential that the ECO serve the environment and not any 
particular party – it is my opinion that they should be independent of all project participants and role players so 
that they can give a totally unbiased record of fact.  BUT the obsession of environmental consultants with 
independence makes them less than effective in the control of environmental risks and impacts’. 
‘The benefits of an EAP performing ECO work include intimate familiarity and improved continuity of EA and 
EMP requirements.  In this case, independence can be managed by delegating ECO work to a senior consultant 
that did not participate in the Basic Assessment or EIA.’ 
‘Preventing corruption, intimidation and/or bias of the ECO.  The risk though, is that the ECO then needs to be 
pretty damn competent to act as such for the interest of their role and not wield their ‘power’ incompetently with 
no one being able to hold them accountable for their actions.’ 
‘I think that sports analogy works best for describing the role of an ECO as a referee of a game, and in the world 
of compliance monitoring, you can’t be the player and the referee.  Without that independence, we get into 
potential bias that always throws doubt into any outcome.  Keep the following in mind: the authorities should be 
seen as the governing body (such as FIFA or SARU) who set the framework, guidelines and laws, the EAP who 
defined the playing field and how that playing field looks for proponents (where the goals are), the developer 
and I&APs as opposing teams (each fighting for an outcome in their favour) and the ECO as the referee who 
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ensures everyone adheres to the rules to ensure that the outcome is fair, accurate and achieves the goals set by 
the EAP.’ 
Interesting to note from the comments reproduced in Box 5 is that the ECO function is not 
viewed as an independent person only, but may also be an independent body.  These bodies 
referred to may be manifested in the form of independent MCs49 consisting of a board of 
members of different categories of people50 with the principal functions of monitoring and 
regulatory control after the necessary authorisations have been issued.51  The role of MCs are 
in many aspects similar to those identified by the practitioners for ECOs, however, the role of 
an appointed ECO in his/her personal capacity in these MCs is a further point of debate that 
currently needs clarification as both literature and the practitioners surveyed are silent on this 
particular topic.  It must be noted that MCs may have a very important function to fulfil in 
particularly supporting the ECO function and clarifying the issue of payment and corruption 
raised by many practitioners; if for example, payment of a MC is made by multiple investors 
(government, developers and NGOs) such as in the Canadian Ekati Mine case study.  It may 
also serve as a monitoring body to monitor the activities of a range of ECOs on different 
projects in a region or a multi-project development situation such as in the Hong Kong 
                                                 
49 WA Ross ‘The Independent Environmental Watchdog: A Canadian Experiment in EIA Follow-up’ in 
Morrison-Saunders and Arts (n1) at 178-190 describes the role of the Independent Environmental Monitoring 
Agency at Ekati Mine in Canada.  Ross mentions that an Environmental Agreement, among other things 
established the Agency as a watchdog for environmental management for both the mine operator (also the 
proponent: BHP Billiton Diamands Inc. (BHPB)) and the regulators (consisting of various agencies of the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories).  The tasks of the Agency included: 
reviewing and commenting on monitoring and management plans and the results of these activities; monitoring 
and encouraging the integration of traditional knowledge into management plans; participating in the regulatory 
process; bringing concerns of the aboriginal peoples and public to mine operators and to government; keeping 
aboriginal peoples and the public informed; and writing an annual report that require response from BHP and 
governments. 
50 According to Ross (n47) at 189, the Agency Board members and the members consisted of: a retired 
senior politician; a retired fisheries consultant with; university professor specialising in different areas; 
environmental consultants with impact assessment experience; and the vice president of the North Slave Metis 
alliance.  It should be noted that these members were sponsored by the various role players.  In relation to South 
Africa, R Midgley ‘Environmental Monitoring Committees’ (2005) 12 The South African Journal of 
Environmental Law and Policy 37 at 46-47, identifies two broad categories of members: firstly, compulsory 
members which consist of permit holders (developers or site operators) and relevant government departments 
(regulators); and secondly, voluntary members which consist of members appointed or elected to represent the 
local.  Neither Ross or Midgley mentions an ECO or Independent Checker as being part of the monitoring 
committee. 
51 Midgley (n50) at 41. 
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scenario. 52  It should be noted that MCs may also have inherent flaws as well.53  Apart from 
individual ECOs and MCs, it is also possible to have a team of ECOs fulfilling the 
compliance monitoring and enforcement function.54  An advantage of a MC and a team of 
ECOs over individual ECOs working alone is that they are more likely to generate a 
relatively balanced and considered view on compliance.  Another advantage may be that the 
diversification may contribute to independence. 
Another important issue that needs highlighting is the perspective on the ECO not serving 
any party or role-player other than the environment itself (thus independence from all) 
through ensuring compliance to environmental conditions.  This independent focus helps 
with: strengthening public perception and integrity of the environmental industry in general; 
gives more authority to ECOs; ensure that non-compliances are reported truthfully; 
disconnects ECOs of budget constraints and also possible corruption and intimidation 
realities.  On the other hand, although in support of independence, some practitioners were 
also of the opinion that there are benefits such as; continuity and familiarity if an EAP fulfils 
the role of the ECO for a particular project.  However, care should be applied for this practice 
in order to ensure independence in some way.  For example, if the same organisation that 
acted as an EAP in the EIA application is awarded the ECO function for the same 
development project, a different individual should be fulfilling the ECO function than the one 
that acted as the EAP.  Finally, the interesting participant analogy of an ECO being a 
“referee” in the environmental compliance game may be a more appropriate description of 
the independent enforcement role than that of “policemen” as described earlier in the paper. 
 
                                                 
52 It is interesting to consider the Hong Kong model where multiple projects in a single locality are being 
followed-up; in the example given by Au and Hui (2004) (n16) the Civil Engineering Department (i.e. a 
government agency) established an Environmental Project Office to oversee the activities of the Independent 
Environmental Checker for each project in a multi-project development situation in order to better account for 
the management of cumulative impacts.   
53 In terms of flaws the DEA (n2) at 20 mentions that although MCs (or EMC) were established on several of 
the projects reviewed, in one of the projects the MC was limited to include only local, provincial and national 
authority representation as previous experiences with MC that included both general public and authorities 
resulted in frequent ‘in-fighting’.  Other problems raised by the DEA include: poor and irregular attendance; 
unclear mandates on the part of the authorities; failure to review documentation; failure to take definitive action 
in response to transgressions of the conditions of the EA and EMP. 
54 A team of ECOs (consisting of a Lead ECO, two ECOs and a Waste Control Officer) for example, where at 
the time of writing this article, fulfilling the compliance monitoring and enforcement role at the Medupi Power 
Station project (near Lephalale, South Africa). 
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4 Conclusion 
This research set out to understand the perspectives of ECO professionals about their own 
industry with particular regard to the matters of role and independence.  The participating 
practitioners identified: compliance monitoring; implementation and enforcement; ensuring 
legal compliance; advising and/or consulting; communicating; reporting; and raisings 
awareness as the key roles of an ECO.  This correlates strongly with and gives effect to the 
intent of the legal provisions and principles contained in s 24 of the Constitution, s 4 of the 
NEMA and the EIA regulations that principally aims to prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation as well as securing sustainable development through the management, 
monitoring and reporting of environmental impacts.  The current legal framework also 
supports the need of an industry that fulfils the abovementioned tasks during the life cycle of 
a project.  Unfortunately current EIA legislation (apart from some site specific Environmental 
Authorisations) do not reflect ECO roles and responsibilities in contrast to Emissions and 
Waste Control Officer requirements in the NEMWA and NEMAQA.  However, self-
regulating mechanisms such as norms, standards or codes may be a more feasible and 
appropriate option than amending existing legislation.  Furthermore, it is vital that the role of 
and the independence of an ECO should be consistently reflected in EA and EMP 
requirements to avoid confusion on these issues in practice. 
To be effective in fulfilling their expected roles, the practitioners identified competency and 
the regulation of the ECO industry as core needs of the industry.  Furthermore, the issue of 
support from the developer, government, I&APs and possible MCs to an ECO surfaced 
several times and practitioners viewed this as being vital in ensuring the success of 
compliance monitoring and enforcement.  It is thus clear that without competence and the 
regulation thereof, as well as proper support, ECOs will not be able to fulfil their roles 
efficiently and effectively.  It must be highlighted, that although the perception may be that 
an ECO should ensure legal compliance on a site an independent ECO in reality has little or 
no authority on a development site unless authority and responsibility for the management, 
implementation and coordination of EA and EMP requirements are specifically given through 
the authorisation, EMP or contractual or other rules of engagement. A key learning point is 
that without clear rules of engagement the role of an independent ECO can be reduced to a 
perfunctory role. 
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The practitioners also held independence of the ECO to all role-players in high regard and 
viewed independence as a critical ingredient in the success of the ECO function and 
ultimately the successful implementation of environmental legal requirements on a 
construction site.  However, caution should be practiced by practitioners not to obsess with 
independence to such an extent that this compromises the ability of an ECO to fulfil their 
roles. 
Drawing together the material presented in this paper a proposed definition for the role of an 
independent ECO might be: ‘An Environmental Control55 Officer is an independent, 
competent person or body in a position to influence people’s behaviour during the 
construction phase of a project; with selected environmental monitoring instruments; in order 
to assure and at times to ensure, record and communicate compliance to applicable 
environmental conditions and performance specifications’. 
                                                 
55  According to C Soanes, FG Fowler and HW Fowler Pocket Oxford English Dictionary (9th ed 2002) at 
178, control is defined as ‘(1) the power to influence people’s behavior or the course of events. (2) the 
restriction of something: crime control. (3) a means of limiting or regulating something: exchange controls. (4) 
a person or a thing used as a standard of comparison for checking the results of a survey or experiment. Origin: 
Old French contreroller ‘keep a copy of a roll of accounts’.  Officer is defined as ‘(1) a person holding a 
position of authority in the armed services.  (2) a person holding a position of authority in an organisation or 
government’.  See Soanes, Fowler and Fowler (n55) at 583. 
